WHAT IS TIMELINESS?
Whenever it is argued that a certain doctrine is timely and of special relevance to our day and age, and whenever this quality is considered in a positive, affirmative sense, the logical premise is that man’s mind is essentially conditioned by time and history. For a mind that possesses the whole of truth simultaneously, as tota et simul to employ the classic phrase of Boethius—for a knowing subject of time-transcending quality, for God, therefore, and perhaps for the pure intellect, there can be nothing “timely,” for the reason that everything is timely. And whenever the human mind is conceived as potentially capable of grasping at any given moment the full content of truth, and consequently man’s essential nature as conditioned by time and history is denied, the notion of “timeliness” again cannot be seriously thought. Metaphysical Rationalism which prescinds from history cannot use the term “timely” in a positive sense; “timely” here becomes practically a synonym for “false” or “heretical.” What is “of the moment” is suspect, has no true being, deserves no attention. It was from this premise that, during the thirteenth century, those who claimed to possess the “entire content of truth” censured Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas as “the great moderns.”
The temporal condition of the human mind, however, seems to have an additional implication, namely, that man, in his history, whether it be individual or collective, does not advance through a continuous process of development like a plant, from a state of inferior to one of greater and more comprehensive understanding. Rather, the actual historical development of the human intellect appears as a progress in the form of assertion and counter-assertion. The assertion does not seize upon the totality of truth in one gradual, uninterrupted process, but, expressing one aspect of truth, necessarily conceals another. The second aspect is brought out in the counter-assertion, which interrupts the assertion until in its turn it is interrupted. As one aspect of the varied and many-sided truth becomes more evident, another aspect in turn recedes from view. And when this other aspect forces its way back from oblivion into consciousness, the earlier aspect tends to fade from the mind. The law underlying this process is concealed from us; it cannot be known in advance or once and for all. The fact that every positive chance involves at the same time a danger shows in the clearest possible manner that the human mind can enjoy no tota et simul Indeed no positive chance can be taken without accepting the risk inherent in it. Consequently it becomes evident that the human mind is essentially finite, time-conditioned, and historical.
But are we not engaged in discussing the concept of timeliness? Actually, we are trying to bring into focus the ambiguity of this concept. If the historical character of knowledge implies that in a particular epoch certain elements of the truth emerge into prominence more definitely than in other times, that therefore certain problems and tasks have greater urgency, that for the same reason other elements of the truth recede and are in danger of being forgotten—how are we to determine what is “relevant” and “timely” in this particular age?
To begin with, everything is obviously timely and relevant which encourages and confirms an epoch in its special values, attitudes and problems, which positively and immediately corresponds with the line of its major effort. But here we should not forget that such an emphasis on the primarily discussed concerns of an epoch must intensify the blind spots of that epoch. This suggests a further notion of “timeliness”: timely is not only what an epoch “wants,” but also what an epoch “needs”; a corrective attitude to the present is timely, the refusal to accept it is timely, or, rather, the refusal of the dangers necessarily inherent in its chances.
Consequently, both the “timely” and the “untimely,” in the immediate sense of these terms, may be relevant to an epoch. When Nietzsche gave his challenging essay, Of the Use and Disadvantage of History for the title, “Untimely Meditations,” he knew, and rightly, that they were of the greatest relevance to his time. In the fact that the “untimely” may be experienced as supremely “timely,” that man’s limited condition can be grasped as limitation, we find, however, another proof of something new and different: that the human mind, in spite of its strict historical boundaries, is not the prisoner of a specific period; rather, that it is truly spirit, capax oriented toward the whole of truth, and therefore capable of detached consideration even of its own time-conditioned existence.
From the start, then, the notion of timeliness contains a note of optimism, of confidence. It is the confidence that each “contemporary” emphasis upon some special feature of truth need not imply a denial of the totality of truth (as every shade of Rationalism tends arrogantly to assume); that, on the contrary, this emphasis might bring with it the chance for a new perception of truth. This chance, as we have seen, is by its nature linked with its inherent danger. We may therefore reach the conclusion that the notion of timeliness includes an element of vigilant confidence in what happens at the moment to be “modern.”
From what has gone before it becomes evident how presumptuous is the undertaking to propose an answer to the question: “What is relevant and timely in our present day and age?” Even supposing that the present age provided a uniform pattern, who would be in a position to say what the age “wants” and what it “needs”; in other words, who could say what is timely and relevant and also what is relevant though untimely? In view of what is happening today in the world, who could achieve the right blend of critical detachment and immediate identity with his time?
For this reason, I am anxious, from the start, to state the limitations of what follows. My intention is merely to consider the problem from this particular angle.